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SUPREME COURT WATCH
RECENT DECISIONS OF SELECTED CRIMINAL CASES | MAX P. SALAZAR, JR.
FILARSKY V. DELIA
Docket Number: 10-1018
Argument: January 17, 2012
Issue:
Whether a private attorney retained to work with govern-
ment employees in conducting an internal investigation is 
barred from asserting qualified immunity because of his status 
as a private lawyer rather than a government employee.
Facts:
Respondent Delia worked for the City of Rialto, 
California’s fire department. In August 2006, he complained 
that he was feeling sick and 
obtained a series of letters 
from his doctor that excused 
him from work but not from 
participating in any other ac-
tivity. After the City became 
suspicious and saw him buy-
ing home-renovation supplies, 
the City started an internal 
affairs investigation to see 
if he was “off-work on false 
pretenses.” The City retained 
petitioner Filarsky to provide 
legal analysis and assist in the 
investigation. After a meeting 
with Delia and a few Fire Chiefs, Filarsky advised the Chiefs 
with a specific course of action. The Chiefs followed through 
and decided to end the investigation after learning that Delia 
had not used the home-renovation supplies.
Delia sued the City, fire department, Filarsky, and other 
unidentified individuals under § 1983. The district court granted 
summary judgment and held that all of the individual defendants, 
including Filarsky, were entitled to qualified immunity. The 
Ninth Circuit then affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court 
affirmed the dismissal of all the individual government defen-
dants while denying summary judgment to Filarsky because he 
“was not entitled to qualified immunity” “as a private attorney.”
Petitioner Filarsky argues that government positions 
entitled to immunity at both local and state levels have his-
torically been filled with people working in the private and 
public sectors. As a result, a person’s formal institution into 
a government position was not dispositive in determining im-
munity. Rather, eligibility for immunity turned on “whether the 
temporarily engaged individual was the functional equivalent 
of a government employee.” Thus, according to Filarsky, courts 
should consider the role performed, supervision of government 
officials, and “the immunity that would have attached to the 
government employees performing the same essential govern-
ment task.” As such, Filarsky’s main contention is that qualified 
immunity should extend to lawyers working under the auspices 
of government.
In contrast, Delia argues that a private individual conduct-
ing an interview is not entitled to qualified immunity under 
Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997). Further, he 
contends that the policy 
reasons for qualified immu-
nity would not be fulfilled if 
immunity was extended to 
private persons conducting 
workplace investigations. 
Delia also does not agree 
with Filarsky’s qualified im-
munity test discussed above 
because it is both “arbitrary 
and unworkable.” Finally, 
Delia points to the distinction 
between private and public 
lawyers; specifically, differ-
ent incentives guide different 
principles of action between the two. As such, Delia does not 
want to extend qualified immunity to private actors.
BLUEFORD V. ARKANSAS
Docket Number: 10-1320
Argument: February 22, 2012
Issue:
Whether, if a jury deadlocks on a lesser-included offense, 
the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the re-prosecution of a greater 
offense after a jury announces that it is “unanimously against” 
guilt on the greater offense.
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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ
Docket No. 11-210
Argument: February 22, 2012
Issue:
Whether the Stolen Valor Act, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b), which 
makes it a crime to falsely represent that you have been awarded 
any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed 
Forces of the United States, is facially invalid under the Free 
Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
Facts:
On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez introduced himself as a 
retired Marine who was awarded the Congressional Medal of 
Honor. However, he had never served in the military and his 
statement garnered no benefits. He was one of the first people 
prosecuted under the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, where Congress 
deemed it a crime to “falsely represent…verbally or in writing, 
to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by 
Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 704(b).
Alvarez brought both a facial and as-applied challenges 
to the constitutionality of the law. The district court denied 
Alvarez’s motion to dismiss. He pled guilty and was sentenced 
to three years probation with a $5,000 fine. The court of 
appeals reversed and remanded. The court first reasoned that 
what Alvarez said did not fall into the historical and traditional 
categories of unprotected speech. Further, the court applied 
strict scrutiny to the law and did not find it to be narrowly 
tailored because “other means exist to achieve the interest of 
stopping such fraud, such as by using more speech, or redrafting 
the Act to target actual impersonation or fraud.”
The Government argues that the law “prohibits a discrete 
and narrow category of factual statements: knowingly false 
representations that a reasonable observer would understand 
as a factual claim that the speaker has been awarded military 
honor.” Further, the Government does not agree with the lower 
court’s decision to apply strict scrutiny when dealing with false 
factual statements; rather, the petitioner advocates a compelling 
interest analysis. Finally, the Government argues that the statute 
provides ample breathing space for protected speech.
Alvarez, on the other hand, agrees with strict scrutiny as the 
standard. Further, he argues that the Government wants to create 
a new standard “that would permit prosecution of lies so long 
as the Government was able to conjure an ‘important’ interest, 
and so long as the law leaves breathing space for fully protected 
speech.” Alvarez rejects this test because it criminalizes lies and 
does not see an inherent value in white lies. Further, he relies 
on a public policy argument to differentiate puffery and social 
Facts:
Petitioner Blueford was charged with capital murder and 
lesser-included offenses. During closing arguments, the State 
urged the jury to not consider the lesser-included offenses until 
they found the petitioner not guilty of first-degree murder. After 
three hours of deliberation, the jury asked what would happen 
if they could not agree on any charge. The judge granted a 
series of dynamite instructions; despite these instructions and 
two more hours of deliberation, the jury was deadlocked on 
the lesser-included offense and the judge declared a mistrial. 
During deliberations, however, the foreperson told the trial 
judge that “the jury had voted ‘unanimous against’ capital 
murder and first-degree murder but had voted 9-3 on man-
slaughter.” As such, petitioner Blueford moved to have the new 
case brought against him for first-degree murder under a double 
jeopardy theory. The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed with the 
court below and held that Blueford could be tried again because 
voicing jury deliberations did not terminate jeopardy.
Blueford contends that what the foreperson told the court 
constituted an acquittal under Double Jeopardy jurisprudence. 
As such, Blueford beseeches the Court to accept substance over 
form when determining whether the acquittal represents a reso-
lution. He further supports this assertion by noting that the “jury 
instructions establish acquittals on the greater offenses by virtue 
of the jury’s deadlock on the lesser-included offense.” Ultimately, 
Blueford sees deliberation and unequivocal expression 
of innocence by the jury as enough evidence that an acquittal 
was reached; any indication otherwise would undermine the 
Double Jeopardy Clause’s policy goals.
Arkansas, on the other hand, relies on Arizona v. 
Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978) to conclude that a deadlocked 
jury warranted a mistrial. As such, jury deliberations do not 
amount to an acquittal under double jeopardy. Arkansas argues 
that the court has drawn a bright line between jury verdicts and 
deliberations; specifically, only the former could result in an 
acquittal. Further, a jury verdict “is a resolution; it represents 
juror agreement at the end of deliberations; it is unmistakably 
clear when it is issued; and it ordinarily cannot be reconsidered 
once it is accepted.” Finally, Arkansas does not see the jury 
instructions as creating an independent mechanism for acquittal. 
Therefore, Arkansas reasons that an implied acquittal does not 
arise because the jurors were allowed to step down from the 
different elements and charges pursuant to the jury instructions.
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speech from harmful lies. Finally, Alvarez concludes that the 
statute will not survive a constitutional challenge even if the 
Government’s test was adopted.
WOOD V. MILYARD
Docket Number: 10-9995
Argument: February 27, 2012
Issues:
(1) Whether an appellate court has the authority to raise 
sua sponte a 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) statute of limitations defense. 
(2) Whether Colorado lost their statute of limitations defense 
after telling the district court that it was not challenging the 
timeliness of Wood’s petition.
Facts:
Petitioner Patrick Wood filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus on February 5, 2008. The district court denied two of his 
six constitutional claims on the merits that dealt with potential 
double jeopardy violations. The Tenth Circuit then granted him 
a certificate of appealability, while making both parties argue 
about the timeliness of Wood’s petition and state procedural 
rules that would prevent the claims from going forward. The 
court noted, however, that Colorado did not challenge the time-
liness of Wood’s petition. Even so, the circuit court raised the 
timeliness defense sua sponte and dismissed the claims.
Petitioner Wood recognizes that “affirmative defenses 
based on statute of limitations must be pled, and such defenses 
are forfeited or waived if not asserted in the district court.” As 
such, Wood concludes that the circuit court overreached its 
authority in resurrecting a claim that was not raised, and that 
not raising it amounts to waiver. Further, Wood recognizes that 
a district court may in some cases sua sponte raise a limitations 
defense under Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006), but 
argues against expanding it to appellate courts. Wood explicitly 
notes the different roles that appellate and district courts hold 
while also recognizing that the Tenth Circuit alone allows an 
appellate court to raise a timeliness defense sua sponte. 
Therefore, Wood relies on policy considerations and precedent 
to bar appellate courts from raising defenses without being 
pleaded in the lower courts.
The respondent, on the other hand, concentrates on the 
waiver issue. Specifically, Milyard construes the State’s state-
ment as an ambiguous expression as to statute of limitations 
defense. In other words, the State did not challenge nor concede 
the timeliness defense, thus, it should not be construed as a 
waiver. As such, Milyard also recognizes a unique quality in 
habeas petitions and would afford appellate courts greater 
latitude in said proceedings. Further, Milyard’s argument rests 
on the distinction between waiver and forfeiture. Thus, Milyard 
does not think that what the State said at the district court 
constituted an “intentional relinquishment of a known right” 
and that an appellate court has the authority to raise a statute 
of limitations defense sua sponte.
MOHAMAD V. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
Docket Number: 11-88
Argument: February 28, 2012
Issue:
Whether the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, which 
authorizes actions against an “individual” who commits acts of 
torture, permits actions against defendants that are not natural 
persons.
Facts:
Azzam Rahim, a United States immigrant from the 
West Bank, was murdered in 1995 under the auspices of the 
Palestinian Authority (PA). Rahim’s son, Mohamad, filed suit 
against the PA in federal district court; he alleged that they were 
responsible for torturing and killing his father. The district court 
held that Mohamad could not sue under the Torture Victim 
Protection Act because the term “individual” did not extend to 
organizations. The appellate court affirmed the judgment under 
a literal reading of the statute.
Petitioner Mohamad argues that the statute’s purposes 
permit expansion of the term “individuals” to non-sovereign 
organizations by analogizing “individual” to “person.” Under 
an expressio unius est exclusio alterius analysis, Mohamad 
further contends that Congress did not mean to limit liability to 
“natural persons.” Mohamad also analogizes the Torture Victim 
Protection Act to international documents establishing liability 
for similar crimes; specifically, these treaties do not concen-
trate liability to natural persons. Finally, Mohamad looks to 
legislative history and concludes that Congress intended to use 
the word “individual” to preclude foreign states from liability. 
Therefore, Mohamad argues custom should broaden torture 
violations under the Torture Victim Protection Act to include 
organizations.
The PA, in contrast, argues for a strict interpretation of 
the statute. Specifically, “[d]ictionaries, common usage, case 
law, and statutes all make clear that the ordinary meaning of ‘in-
dividuals’ is a natural person or human being.” The respondent 
rebuts Mohamad’s contention that “person” and “individual” 
are similar. Finally, the PA also looks at Congressional in-
tent and concludes that Congress carefully used “individual” 
because it wanted to limit liability to natural persons.
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SOUTHERN UNION COMPANY  
V. UNITED STATES
Docket Number: 11-94
Argument: March 19, 2012
Issue:
Whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendment principles that the 
Supreme Court established in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466 (2000) (concluding that a jury must find a fact that increases 
a prison sentence beyond the otherwise applicable statutory 
maximum) apply to criminal fines.
Facts:
Southern Union (SU), a gas company, violated a federal 
statute for storing mercury without a permit. After a mercury 
spill, SU tried to mitigate damages with surrounding residents. 
A jury found SU guilty and at sentencing SU was fined $50,000 
for each day of the violation; this amounted to millions. SU 
objected to this calculation and thought it was inconsistent 
under Apprendi because “the jury did not determine the number 
of days or duration of the [statute] violation and, therefore, 
the maximum sentence supported by the jury’s verdict was 
the maximum fine for a one-day violation.” The district court 
rejected this argument and held that Apprendi does not apply to 
criminal fines. The appellate court rejected SU’s argument as 
well and relied on Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009) to hold 
Apprendi inapplicable to the facts.
SU’s main argument is that the Court’s reasoning 
in Apprendi does not provide an adequate basis to distinguish 
between fines and jail time under the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment. Further, the Supreme Court’s historical analysis 
and application of Apprendi in United States v. Booker, 543 
U.S. 220 (2005), does not explicitly isolate imprisonment 
as the sole sentence that requires a jury to find any fact that 
increases punishment beyond a statutory maximum. SU also 
believes the appellate court erred in relying on Ice because it 
“did not involve a criminal fine and is properly understood as 
a narrow decision that merely declined to extend the Apprendi 
principle to the multiple offense context.” Finally, SU argues 
that if Apprendi does not encompass fines, then innocent people 
may be forced to plead guilty absent constitutional safeguards 
against judicial abuse.
The United States does not advocate extending Apprendi to 
criminal fines. Also, the government agrees with the appellate 
court’s interpretation of Ice; specifically, the jury does not have 
to find any fact when allowing consecutive sentences. Further, 
criminal fines are fundamentally different than imprisonment 
or capital punishment because fines “involve a deprivation of 
property, while [imprisonment or capital punishment involve] a 
deprivation of liberty or life.” As such, the United States argues 
that applying Apprendi to fines would undermine the historical 
distinction or concern between cash punishment and freedom 
while eroding judicial sentencing discretion.
MILLER V. ALABAMA
Docket Number: 10-9646
Argument: March 20, 2012
Issue:
Whether imposing a sentence of life without possibility of 
parole on a fourteen-year-old offender who committed capital 
murder violates the Eighth Amendment under the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause.
Facts:
Evan Miller was convicted of capital murder for an 
offense committed when he was fourteen. He was sentenced 
to life-without-parole. The Alabama Circuit Court denied 
Miller’s new-trial motion that called for an Eight Amendment 
violation because the court allegedly did not consider Miller’s 
age or other mitigating circumstances. On appeal, the Alabama 
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed because capital murder 
justified a life-without-parole sentence regardless of age.
Miller argues that fourteen-year-olds should not be subject 
to a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of release 
under an Eight Amendment theory. Specifically, the Court’s 
holdings in Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida show 
that “youth and its attendant features have a critical role to play 
in determining an adolescent’s culpability.” Therefore, Miller 
relies mostly on policy considerations and Supreme Court 
precedent to assert that age should play a bigger role in life-
without-parole jurisprudence.
Alabama believes that the Eight Amendment allows life-
without-parole sentences to be imposed on murderers under 
eighteen. Alabama also relies on statutory analysis across 
multiple jurisdictions in the United States to assert that most 
states allow life-without-parole sentences for aggravated murder 
when the offender was fourteen. The state also rebuts Miller’s 
argument about the rarity of said sentences because “it is only 
a very few fourteen-year-olds committing aggravated murder.” 
Further, Alabama sees the distinction between fourteen and 
eighteen-year-olds as a judicial fiction when it comes to scien-
ter, but also recognizes that fourteen-year-olds are exempt from 
the death penalty whereas their eighteen-year-old compatriots 
are not. Finally, the state also relies on policy considerations 
to show that a life-without-parole sentence is appropriate and 
comports with the Eighth Amendment.
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VASQUEZ V. UNITED STATES
Docket Number: 11-199
Argument: March 21, 2012
Issues:
(1) Whether the Seventh Circuit violated the harmless 
error rule when it focused its harmless error analysis solely on 
the weight of the untainted evidence without considering the 
potential effect of the error (the erroneous admission of trial 
counsel’s statements that his client would lose the case and 
should plead guilty for their truth) on the jury. (2) Whether the 
Seventh Circuit violated Vasquez’s Sixth Amendment right 
to a jury trial by determining that Vasquez should have been 
convicted without considering the effects of the district court’s 
error on the jury that heard the case.
Facts:
Petitioner Alexander Vasquez was charged with conspiracy 
to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and attempting to 
possess with the intent to distribute cocaine after a monitored 
drug transaction where he crashed into a police car and was 
found at a McDonalds. A government witness testified that 
Vasquez was not supposed to be there. Also, the government 
introduced evidence of a prior cocaine conviction for Vasquez 
of which his role was not duplicated in the case at hand. In 
addition, the government used recordings to show that 
Vasquez’s lawyer said that “everyone is going to lose at trial 
and that [Vasquez] should plead guilty.” The statements were 
heard four times and the jury convicted after eight hours of 
deliberation. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed that the 
recordings should not have been allowed in, but deemed it a 
harmless error and affirmed the conviction. The Seventh Circuit 
reasoned that there was enough evidence to convict otherwise.
Petitioner Vasquez asks the Supreme Court to reconsider 
the appellate court’s harmless-error analysis. Specifically, 
the analysis should “require consideration of an error’s effect 
in the context of the entire record.” Further, Vasquez argues 
that the error heavily influenced the jury’s decision to convict. 
As such, the Court should not focus on “overwhelming inde-
pendent evidence” because it undermines the policy governing 
harmless-error jurisprudence and violates the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial. Therefore, Vazquez contends that a judge 
makes a guilt determination when he/she only asks if there was 
enough independent evidence to convict and allows prejudicial 
evidence into the record erroneously.
The United States agrees with the Seventh Circuit in that 
the court “appropriately articulated the harmless-error standard 
and correctly concluded based on its review of the ‘evidence as 
a whole’ that the non-constitutional trial error did not alter the 
verdict.” Further, the government argues that the appellate court 
complied with the standard and independently determined that 
there was a “fair assurance” that the jury’s decision would not 
have been different had the error not been made. The govern-
ment also disagrees with Vasquez’s Sixth Amendment claim 
because it was the jury who convicted him in the first place. 
Thus, the United States concludes that the Seventh Circuit’s 
application of the harmless-error standard was objective and the 
erroneous admission of evidence was harmless because the case 
would not have been decided differently.
REICHLE V. HOWARDS
Docket Number: 11-262
Argument: March 21, 2012
Issues:
 (1) Whether probable cause to make an arrest bars a First 
Amendment retaliatory arrest claim. (2) Whether the court 
below erred by denying qualified and absolute immunity to 
petitioners where probable cause existed for respondent’s ar-
rest, the arrest comported with the Fourth Amendment, and the 
denial of immunity threatens to interfere with the split-second, 
life-or-death decisions of Secret Service agents protecting the 
President and Vice President.
Facts:
On June 16, 2006, respondent Howards walked through 
an outdoor shopping center to take his son to a piano recital. 
He saw Vice President Dick Cheney shaking hands and taking 
pictures with patrons. Secret Service Agent Doyle protected 
Vice President Cheney that day and heard Howards say, “I’m 
going to ask [Cheney] how many kids he’s killed today.” Agent 
Doyle also saw an opaque bag in Howards’ hands. Howards 
approached the Vice President, exchanged a few words, touched 
Cheney’s right shoulder with his open hand, and walked away. 
Protective Intelligence Coordinator Agent Reichle was called 
to investigate the incident and determined there was probable 
cause to arrest Howards. Howards was detained for a few hours 
at the Eagle County Sheriff’s Department, but state charges 
were eventually dropped and no federal charges were filed.
Howards sued Agents Reichle and Doyle under § 1983 
alleging First and Fourth Amendment violations. The district 
court denied the Agents’ motion for summary judgment. The 
Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court 
rejected the Fourth Amendment claim on the idea that the 
Agents had probable cause to arrest. However, the court held 
that probable cause was not a bar to Howard’s First Amendment 
retaliation claim.
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The Agents argue that the First Amendment claim should 
be barred under an extension of Hartman v. Moore; here, the 
Supreme Court barred retaliatory prosecution claims where prob-
able cause supports the prosecution. Further, the Agents argue 
that they should have flexibility in arresting people who can 
cause potential harm to the President without hesitation. Also, 
the Agents beseech the Court to protect them under qualified im-
munity. Therefore, the Agents want the probable cause standard 
to bar retaliatory arrest claims against the Secret Service.
In contrast, Howards argues that a First Amendment 
retaliatory arrest suit should lie “regardless of whether the arrest-
ing officer possessed probable cause to make an arrest when that 
officer was actually motivated by personal animus toward the 
protected speech.” Further, Howards does not want the Agents’ 
qualified immunity to be transferred into absolute immunity 
because probable cause itself should not legalize a retaliatory 
prosecution. Ultimately, Howards does not think that probable 
cause should bar a First Amendment retaliation arrest suit.
DORSEY V. UNITED STATES / HILL V. 
UNITED STATES
Docket Number: 11-5683 (Dorsey); 11-5721 (Hill)
Argument: April 17, 2012
Issue: 
Whether the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 applies in an 
initial sentencing preceding that takes place on or after the 
statute’s effective date if the offense occurred before that date.
Facts:
The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) reduced the dispar-
ity between crack and powdered cocaine necessary to trigger 
possible United States criminal penalties while eliminating 
a five-year mandatory minimum sentence for crack cocaine 
possession. The Dorsey v. United States and Hill v. United 
States litigations were consolidated. In August 2008, Dorsey 
was arrested in Illinois and charged with possession with intent 
to distribute five or more grams of cocaine base. Petitioner 
Dorsey admitted to possessing 5.5 grams of crack cocaine. 
He asked for an FSA sentence on this and prior felony drug 
convictions but the district court rejected his argument. The 
appellate court affirmed the judgment below because it did not 
interpret the FSA as a law that applies retroactively.
In March 2007, petitioner Hill sold around 53.3 grams of 
crack cocaine to an informant. He was charged and convicted 
with distributing fifty grams or more of cocaine base. He was 
sentenced to 120 months in jail even though the mandatory 
minimum for his offense would have been five years had the 
FSA been retroactively applied. The appellate court affirmed 
under similar reasoning in Dorsey.
Petitioners under Dorsey and Hill argue that Congress 
intended the FSA to apply retroactively and the language in the 
statute reflected that aim. Accordingly, “it would make little 
sense to require the [Sentencing] Commission to incorporate 
the [new] ratio into emergency Guidelines if the pre-FSA 
mandatory minimums would remain ‘applicable law’ for the 
thousands of pre-enactment offenders who would be sentenced 
under those emergency guidelines.” Petitioners then looked at 
legislative history to show that if Congress intended the FSA to 
take effect post-enactment, then an earlier version with similar 
wording would not have been scratched. Finally, Dorsey and 
Hill argue that the purpose of the FSA was to ensure fairness 
in cocaine sentencing and not applying it retroactively would 
halter that goal.
The United States argues that Section 109 of the U.S. 
Code forbids retroactivity because the FSA does not expressly 
endorse such an application. The government thus does not find 
any justification to apply the FSA retroactively under the four 
corners of the statute. Finally, the United States disputes the 
petitioner’s fairness argument by arguing that “Congress never 
avowedly changes sentencing practices to make them less fair; 
yet the general rule . . . in Section 109 precludes retroactive 
application of those changes in the mine run of cases.” Therefore, 
the United States asserts a prospective application of the FSA.
ARIZONA V. UNITED STATES
Docket Number: 11-182
Argument: April 25, 2012
Issue:
Whether federal immigration laws preclude Arizona’s 
efforts at cooperative law enforcement and impliedly preempt 
four provisions of S.B. 1070 (state law authorizing and direct-
ing law enforcement officers to cooperate and communicate 
with federal officials regarding the enforcement of federal 
immigration law and imposing penalties for non-compliance 
with federal immigration requirements) facially. 
Facts:
Arizona enacted a state law (S.B. 1070) meant to help 
authorize and direct state law enforcement officers to cooperate 
and talk to federal officials about enforcing federal immigration 
laws. The United States filed suit to enjoin four provisions of the 
law that allegedly federal law preempts. The district court held 
that federal immigration law preempted said four provisions and 
the appellate court affirmed.
The government argues that they alone have jurisdiction 
over immigration issues. Further, the Supreme Court in Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), “established that Congress had 
left no room for the States to adopt their own rival registration 
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rules. Section 3 of S.B. 1070 fails under that holding.” As such, 
it is up to Congress and the federal government to deal with 
immigration issues while not permitting Arizona to create its 
own immigration policy. Therefore, the United States beseeches 
the Supreme Court to render the Arizona law unconstitutional.
Arizona, however, sees no clear conflict between S.B. 1070 
and federal law. Further, the state rejects the idea that it’s creat-
ing its own immigration policy. Ultimately, Arizona sees itself 
as a state that suffers from disproportionate impact because of 
illegal immigration. Therefore, Arizona seeks to strike a balance 
between creating its immigration policy and being “impliedly 
stripped of its plenary authority and at the mercy of the federal 
executive’s lax enforcement policy.” Thus, Arizona seeks to 
have the four provisions previously enjoined upheld.
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